NET may make copies of the data (in the process memory) that cannot be erased by KeePass.Ī 2019 study linked on Reddit (using KeePass 2.40) has demonstrated how passwords can be left in memory unencrypted. ), importing/exporting files (except KDBX) and loading/saving unencrypted files. Operations that result in unencrypted data in the process memory include, but are not limited to: displaying data (not asterisks) in standard controls, searching data, replacing placeholders (during auto-type, drag&drop, copying to clipboard. For example, in order to show a password in the standard list view control provided by Windows, KeePass must supply the cell content (the password) as unencrypted string (unless hiding using asterisks is enabled). it overwrites these memory areas before releasing them.įor some operations, KeePass must make sensitive data available unencryptedly in the process memory. Note that this has nothing to do with the encryption of database files in database files, all data (including user names, etc.) is encrypted.įurthermore, KeePass erases all security-critical memory (if possible) when it is not needed anymore, i.e. For performance reasons, the process memory protection only applies to sensitive data sensitive data here includes for instance the master key and entry passwords, but not user names, notes and file attachments. This means that even if you would dump the KeePass process memory to disk, you could not find any sensitive data. While KeePass is running, sensitive data is stored encryptedly in the process memory. It admittedly tries its best to protect your passwords (but not your user names etc.) in memory: Keepass provides some protection against this threat. ![]() Mainly not because ARC4 cryptographically isn't that strong, butīecause the key for in-memory encryption is also stored in swappableĪssuming there is malware on your device which tries to scan main memory for your sensitive data, the answer unfortunately is no. Note that this is less secure than DPAPI, IfĭPAPI is not available or disabled (advanced KeePass options, byĭefault using DPAPI is enabled), KeePass uses the ARC4 encryptionĪlgorithm with a random key. Stored in a secure, non-swappable memory area managed by Windows. ![]() With DPAPI, the key for in-memory encryption is KeePass ≥ 1.15 and 2.x use the Windows DPAPI for in-memory encrypting Releasing them (this applies to all security-critical memory, not only Immediately re-encrypts it using the random key.Īdditionally, KeePass erases all security-critical memory when it's This means that even if you would dump the KeePass process memory toįor example, when you are copying a password to the clipboard, KeePassįirst decrypts the password field, copies it to the clipboard and Key and entry passwords) is stored encrypted in process memory. While KeePass is running, sensitive data (like the hash of the master Why don't you read the Keepass manual, and decide yourself?
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